

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action

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Control 16-68

Date October 22, 1968

10:30 A. M.

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FROM: Buenos Aires

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1152, October 22, 10 A. M.

NIACIT.

ELITE EYES ONLY.

Although naturally operating on a low probability basis, the last first phone of Department Foreign Minister, in view of lack of confidence in us, will cause considerable alarm and confusion. Foreign Minister is himself likely to be Foreign Office official, in our view, will be puzzled by reference to intelligence on possible disorders of "unprecedented violence" if this unreported or unconfirmed by Argentine side. Foreign Office official also likely be puzzled by our report of imminent danger; and request for strengthening security measures in face circumstance that group of U.S. Mayors being entertained here in public function and Billy Graham preaching in Luna Park, obviously unwarned by us (and we do not feel authorized by reference Department Circular telegram to warn them or other U.S. citizens directly or through Consulate here or in Cordoba). Indeed, if Ambassador McClintock does not return in time to sit on reference Department Circular telegram Foreign Minister will be additionally puzzled.

I will brief field his questions and place major emphasis on Washington as source of intelligence reports in expectation evidence will develop so rapidly that initial skepticism and puzzlement soon will be forgotten. Should be noted, however, that October 21 Buenos Aires HERALD carried front page AP dispatch containing Pentagon denial of buildup for Cuban invasion and October 22 paper headline: "White House Denies"

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Mr. Hill, Director of the M. I. 6, and Buenos Aires.

"Plumdown over Cuba". In face of these reports (HC ac 10, 10, 10, MT NEWS Broadcast had similar story), Foreign Minister Guido will consider Washington "evidence" of upcoming Communist infiltration as confirmation U.S. invasion plans and as Washington claims rapidly Communists will react to "aggression" as publicly they do not wish. Thus, U.S. will appear even to its friends at first glance as unnecessarily disingenuous and as "provoking" reported Communist reaction.

Moreover, Foreign Minister or other high civilian or Foreign Office officers bound unfavorably react to request for interview with President Guido. He will normally and naturally prefer to wait receipt more concrete persuasive details concerning threat to Argentine security and U.S. interests here before agreeing to alert his Chief. He will probably, however, do so but with misgivings and resentment at our seeming lack of trust in him.

1. Ordinarily, urge amendment of instructions Department Circular 10, Item 700 concerning initial contact with Foreign Minister to:

a. Sanction reference to anti emphasis on Washington's and its repressive nuclear buildup in Cuba. This would put emphasis on aggression on Cuban Reds where beliefs and results differ to compare U.S. intelligence reports on domestic scene with point of view and minimize otherwise certain skepticism and purblindness.

b. Sanction reference to likely imminent message from President Kennedy to President Guido as basis for anticipating need for appointment with latter. Alternatively, delete reference in conversation with Foreign Minister to anticipated need for appointment with President Guido until letter from President Kennedy has arrived here.

Instructions requested NIACT.

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